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[67 C.2d

PEOPLE 11. GASTELO

[Crim. No. 11197. In Bank. Oct. 30,1967.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MAX MUNOZ
GASTELO, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Searches and Seizures-Search Warrants-Execution-Una.i1nounced Forcible Entry.-Forcible entry into a house to execute a search warrant, in the absence of the refusal of admittance by the occupant following notice of the peace officer's
authority and purpose spooified in Pen. Code, § 1531, cannot be
justified on the blanket basis of the crime or evidence
involved, such as narcotics cases or other cases involving easily
disposable evidence; for such entry, as in any kind of police
action tending to disturb the security of people in their homes,
U.S. C.Jnst., 4th Amend., requires that a particular reason must
be shown, based on specific facts (disapproving, to the extent
inconsistent herewith, People v. Manriquez, 231 Cal.App.2d 725 __ _
[42 Cal.Rptr. 157], and People v. Samuels, 229 Cal.App.2d 351
[40 Cal.Rptr. 290]).
[2] Poisons - Narcotics - Admissibility of Evidence - Unlawful
Search.-In a prosecution for possession )f heroin (Health &
Safe Code, § 11500), it was reversible error to admit into evidence a small packet of heroin found by the police between
the mattress and box springs of defendant's bed, where such
evidence was crucial to the prosecution's case and where,
although the police had a search warrant, the only proffered
justification for their unannounced forcible entry into the
apartment, in violation of Pen. Code, § 1531, was the asserted
general propensity of narcotics violators to destroy evidence
when confronted by police officers.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Joseph A. Wapner, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for possession of heroin. Judgment of conviction reversed.
Frederic G. Marks, under appointment by
Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

th~

Supreme

Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, S. Clark Moore and Richard Tanzer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Rev., Searches and Seizures, § 17; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures (1st ed § 41).
McK. Dig. References: [1] SearcheR and Seizures, § 17; [2]
Poisons, § 14; Searches and Seizures, § 17.
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[67 C.2d 586; 63 Cal.Rptr. 10, 432 P.2d 706]

TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction of possession of heroin in violation of section 11500
of the Health and Safety Code.
The facts are not in dispute. Los Angeles police officers
obtained a warrant for the search of the apartment of Donna
Trujillo, with whom defendant was living, on the basis of a
reliable informant's report that he had purchased narcotics
from defendant at Donna's apartment more than 30 times
during the previous 45 days. His last purchase was on December 23, 1964. About 8 :20 in the morning of Saturday, December 26, 1964, four officers went to Donna's apartment to execute the warrant. Outside they saw an automobile that they
believed was defendant's. Two officers went to the rear door of
the apartment and two to the front. Without knocking,
announcing their purpose or demanding admittance, they
forced entry through both doors. Defendant and Donna Trujillo were asleep in the bedroom, and the officers pulled
defendant from the bed. They served the warrant, searched
the apartment, and found a small packet of heroin between
the mattress and box springs of the bed. Defendant was
arrested. Two days later, he confessed to possession of the
heroin.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting the heroin into evidence over his objection that it was illegally obtained in violation of Penal Code,
section 1531.
Section 1531 provides that to execute a search warrant
««The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house~ . . . if, after notice of his authority and
purpose, he is refused admittance. "
The Attorney General contends that compliance with section 1531 was excused under the rule of People v. Maddox
(1956) 46 Ca1.2d 301 [294 P.2d 6].
In Maddox, we held that compliance with the Bubsfimtially
identical notice requirements of Penal Code section 844 for
making arrests 1 was excused, if the facts known to the officer
before his entry were sufficient to support his good faith belief
that compliance would have increased his peril or frustrated
the arrest. Later cases have included the prevention of destruction of evidence as an additional ground for noncompliance
l' 'To make an arrest, .•. a peace· officer, may break open the door ...
of the house in which the person to be arrested is . . . after having de·
manded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is
desired.' ,
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with section 844. (Peoplc v. Covan (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 416
[2 Cal.Rptr. 811] ; Peoplc v. Morris (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 81
[320 P.2d 67].) Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23 [10
L.Ed.2d 726, 83 S.Ct. 1623], approved the principle of these
cases under Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.
The same principle supports similar exceptions to the requirements of section 1531.
[1] The Attorney General contends that unannounced
forcible entry to execute a search warrant is always reasonable in narcotics cases, on the ground that narcotics violators
normally are on the alert to destroy the easily disposable evidence quickly at the first sign of an officer's presence.
We do not agree with this contention. Neither this court nor
the United States Supreme Court has held that unannounced
forcible entries may be authorized by a blanket rule based on
the type of crime or evidence involved. Indeed in the Ker case
the court' was divided 4 to 4 on the question whether the
evidence offered to excuse compliance with the notice and
demand requirements was sufficient. 2
In Maddox, the officers knocked, heard a male voice call
"wait a minute" followed by the sound of retreating footsteps, and only then forced entry. Similarly, in People v. Carrillo (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 387 [50 Ca1.Rptr. 185, 412 P.2d 377],
entry followed a knock and observation of suspicious movements. In People v. Smith (1966) 63 Cal.2d 779 [48 Cal.Rptr.
382, 409 P.2d 222], and People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d
690 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365], the officers were in fresh
pursuit of gun-wielding defendants. Similarly, in People v.
Hammond (1960) 54 Ca1.2d 846 [9 Ca1.Rptr. 233, 357 P.2d
289], officers had cause to believe defendant had a. gun and
was under the influence of heroin at the time of arrest.
Thus we have excused compliance with the statute in
accordance with established common law exceptions to the
notice and demand requirements on the basis of the specific
facts involved. No such basis exists for nullifying the statute
in all narcotics cases, and, by logical extension, in all other
cases involving easily disposable evidence. The statute does
not contain the seeds of such far-reaching self-destruction.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a specific showing must
always be made to justify any kind of police action tending to
disturb the security of the people in their homes. Unan2Justice Harlan was of the opinion that Fourth Amendment standards
should not be applied to the states. Thus, the judgment of conviction
was affirmed, 5·4.

)

nounced forcible entry is in itself a serious disturbance of
that security and cannot be justified on a blanket basis.
Otherwise the constitutional test of reasonableness would turn
only on practical expediency, and the amendment's primary
safeguard-the requirement of particularity-would be lost.
Just as the police must have sufficiently particular reason to
enter at all, so must they have some particular reason to enter
in the manner chosen. To the extent that People v. Mam'iquez
(1965) 231 CalApp.2d 725 [42 CalRptr. 157], and People v.
Samuels (1964) 229 CalApp.2d 351 [40 CalRptr. 290], are
contrary to our conclusion herein, they are disapproved.
[2] Since there was nothing in the present case to justify
the officers' failure to comply with section 1531: except an
asserted general propensity of narcotics violators to destroy
evidence when confronted by police officers, the officers' entry
was unlawful The illegally obtained evidence, which was crucial to the prosecution '8 case, should therefore have been
excluded.
The judgment is reversed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.

